Undoing the Last Four Years: Federal Circuit Clarifies the Burden of Proof in VA Discipline

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By Deborah Hopkins, August 13, 2021

Over the last four years, the VA has enjoyed a lower burden of proof in taking disciplinary actions against employees covered by the VA Accountability and Whistleblower Protection Act, 38 USC 714. Indeed, Congress passed this law in 2017 to make it easier to fire bad employees at the VA.

Between then and today, we have learned that the law is not retroactive for actions that occurred prior to its enactment (Sayers v. VA, 954 F.3d 1370 (Mar. 31, 2020); Brenner v. VA, No. 2019-2032 (Mar. 9, 2021)) and that, while MSPB has no penalty mitigation authority in actions taken under this law, agencies must show by substantial evidence that their selected penalty is reasonable. Mogil v. VA, No. 2018-1673 (Fed. Cir. May 1, 2019). Ok, fine. We can live with that.

Now, get ready.

On August 12, the Federal Circuit hit us with a big one. In this case, a Supervisory Consumer Affairs Specialist named Ariel Rodriguez yelled and used profanity at a patient in a VA facility. The confrontation escalated and the police were called. The police had to escort Rodriguez to his office because he was so agitated. After that, Rodriguez returned to the reception area, where he again confronted the patient. During the investigation that followed, Rodriguez was dishonest in his account of the events that occurred. He also attempted to influence one of his employees to alter her testimony to the investigator.

Rodriguez was removed on three charges: (1) disruptive behavior toward a veteran patient; (2) conduct unbecoming a federal supervisor, and (3) lack of candor. The facts justified an easy removal for the VA – or so we all thought. Plenty of witnesses, police activity, a patient’s wellbeing in danger, clear nexus – no question there was substantial evidence of misconduct and substantial evidence to support removal.

But wait.

The Federal Circuit saw things differently. There are two huge new takeaways that every management official at the VA must be aware of, courtesy of this case, Rodriguez v. VA, No. 2019-2025 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 12, 2021).

  1. The standard of proof for a VA to take a disciplinary action is a PREPONDERANCE of the evidence; the substantial standard in the statute only refers to MSPB’s review of the action.
  2. The VA must complete a Douglas factors analysis for its disciplinary actions, even though the MSPB lacks authority to mitigate the agency’s penalty.

Let’s look at each in turn.

  1. Burden of Proof

For the past four years, just about everyone in this business has been under the impression that the language in 38 USC 714(d)(2)-(3) “if the decision is supported by substantial evidence” meant that the agency action also required the substantial evidence standard. It’s even in the VA’s Discipline policy.

But the Federal Circuit said otherwise:

The references to “substantial evidence” in section 714 are all explicitly directed to the standard of review to be applied by administrative judges and the Board. Those references do not address the standard of proof to be applied by the DVA in making disciplinary determinations, nor does the remaining text of section 714 explicitly address the standard of proof in proceedings before the DVA…[T]he language of section 714 implies that the proper standard is the preponderance of the evidence. Section 714 provides that an employee may be removed, demoted, or suspended “if the Secretary determines the performance or misconduct of the covered individual warrants” such action. In the case of a disciplinary action based on misconduct, the requirement that the Secretary “determine” that the misconduct in question warrants disciplinary action implies that the Secretary must find that it is likely, i.e., more likely than not, that the employee has engaged in the misconduct that justifies the proposed discipline. [bold added]

The court’s explanation included discussion that if substantial evidence was the standard used, a Deciding Official would be required to find against the employee with regard to the charged misconduct even if the Deciding Official did not personally agree with that conclusion, because when substantial evidence is applied, a reasonable person might disagree and yet the standard is still met. The court said in no uncertain terms that the VA Accountability and Whistleblower Protection Act does not contain “any language stating explicitly, or even implicitly, that the burden of proof in disciplinary actions should be substantial evidence.”

Because the agency applied the substantial evidence standard in this case, what we now know is an incorrect standard, it was remanded back to the MSPB.

  1. Douglas Factors

Because the VA Accountability and Whistleblower Protection Act explicitly states that the MSPB does not have the authority to mitigate the agency’s penalty (38 USC 714(d)(2)(B)), in the first year or two after the law’s enactment the VA was (and the rest of us were) under the impression that Douglas factors were not required. In other words, if a penalty could not be mitigated, then there was no need to justify the penalty – and penalty defense is the primary reason why agencies use the Douglas factors.

Starting in 2019, the Federal Circuit determined that there must be substantial evidence the agency’s penalty is reasonable, otherwise the MSPB could remand a case back to an agency to determine a more appropriate penalty. Mogil, above.

The court in Rodriguez takes things further and says, “this court has made clear that the absence of mitigation authority does not deprive the Board of the authority to review penalties for substantial evidence” and that mitigation authority is completely divorced from “the power to review and strike down the DVA’s imposition of penalties that are arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or not in accordance with law.” To that end:

For a reviewing tribunal to find a decision not arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law, that decision must have been based “on a consideration of the relevant factors and whether there has been a clear error of judgment…” [citation omitted] Accordingly, because the Board must review the DVA’s penalty selection in a section 714 case, that review must ensure that the DVA considered the relevant factors bearing on the penalty determination.

The court emphasized this point by declaring the Deciding Official must “weigh the relevant factors bearing on the appropriateness of the penalty, including the relevant Douglas factors” in cases of misconduct. So, there it is.

There is a whole lot more to discuss from this decision, but we’ll tackle those issues another time. As for now, we are anticipating multiple years’ worth of cases will be remanded to determine whether the VA had a preponderance of the evidence, and not merely substantial evidence, in taking appealable disciplinary actions. The good news for the VA is, preponderance is not too difficult to show, and I would bet they can meet this burden in nearly every case. The bad news is there’s a whole lot more work ahead. Please let us know how we can help – and attend UnCivil Servant September 8-9 or MSPB Law Week September 13-17 for all the details on what happens now. Hopkins@FELTG.com

Should Your Agency use Progressive Discipline or Performance Demonstration Periods with Probationers?

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By Deborah Hopkins, July 21, 2021

The question in this article’s title has come up a few times over the last several weeks, particularly during our flagship UnCivil Servant training classes.

We’ll give you the short answer, and then the longer answer.

Short answer: No.

Explanation: According to OPM, “The law and regulations specifically exclude probationary/trial employees from the procedures that require the use of an opportunity to improve. This exclusion is because the entire probationary period is similar to an opportunity period. These employees should receive closer supervision, instruction, and training as needed during the first year of their employment.” The same principle is true when it comes to discipline. The agency doesn’t have to justify its penalty in removing a probationer, so even minor misconduct that wouldn’t justify removal of a career employee can warrant a probationer’s removal.

As soon as there’s a performance or conduct issue, the law allows to the agency to remove the probationer, even if the offense is minor.

Here is why removing a probationer without a Demonstration Period or progressive discipline makes sense:

  • The proof necessary to remove a probationer is very low.
  • The action can be taken and effected in one day.
  • If the probationer is ALREADY having performance or conduct issues, just imagine how they might behave once their due process rights attach.
  • It expedites the process to get the position posted again.

Now, read the headline again and then check out the next piece of discussion.

Longer answer: Maybe, probably not, but if you do then you’d better realize WHY you’re doing it.

Explanation: If a probationary employee is already having performance or conduct issues, the supervisor needs to think very hard about whether the additional time and effort spent to coach, train, work closely with, mentor, and help the probationer along is worthwhile. Because once that probationer hits their one-year mark (in most jobs, anyway), they become a fully vested career employee where civil service protections attach. It’s still possible for the agency to take an action against a career employee, as FELTG readers well know, but the simplicity of a probationer’s removal cannot be overstated.

The below situations might be reasons why a supervisor decides to keep a probationer around:

  • The position is difficult to recruit for or the job is located in a remote place.
  • The benefit to the government of working with the employee outweighs the drawback to the supervisor.
  • The employee has a unique skillset that it is worth the extra oversight to keep that person employed by the agency.
  • The employee’s attitude shows willingness to learn and improve.
  • The misconduct cannot be forgiven, but the supervisor doesn’t think it requires the probationer’s removal.

Surely, there are multiple other reasons why supervisors might keep probationers around. And let me be clear: I am not advocating pro- or con- removal, one way or the other. I just think it is important to point out that probationers have very few rights to their jobs while in the probationary period. If an agency is having a problem with a probationer, that supervisor should think very hard about making life easier and handling the problem now. However, if the supervisor thinks there’s hope for the employee, I can absolutely understand and support that position as well. Regardless of your stance on this issue, best of luck with all your probationary employees.  Hopkins@FELTG.com

Do You Know the Difference Between Willful and Intentional Misconduct? If Not, You’d Better Read This

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By Deborah Hopkins, July 12, 2021

A few weeks ago, my colleague and FELTG Founding Father Bill Wiley drew my attention to a Federal Circuit decision that gave the Federal employment law world an important distinction in legal definitions. The case involved an IRS agent who disclosed confidential taxpayer information, including personally identifiable information (PII), to an unauthorized person for her own benefit. The unauthorized person was her attorney, and the information was disclosed as the attorney was preparing a response to a proposed suspension for “displaying discourteous and unprofessional conduct and for failing to follow managerial directives.”

The IRS removed the employee for “intentionally disclosing taxpayer information to an unauthorized person” and the MSPB AJ upheld her removal, agreeing with the agency that the misconduct was severe because “taxpayer privacy is ‘sacrosanct.’” In addition, the employee had received training on the importance of keeping taxpayer PII private, did not redact any PII before sending the information to her attorney, and did not receive permission from the agency to disclose the information.

She appealed her removal to the Federal Circuit. While acknowledging the disclosure of taxpayer PII was improper, she argued on appeal that removal was too harsh because “[t]he penalty imposed was that for willful disclosure, rather than negligent disclosure.”

Keep in mind, the charge was “intentionally disclosing taxpayer information to an unauthorized person.”

The Federal Circuit did not agree with her argument, but rather agreed with the MSPB that her “removal was properly predicated on her intention to disclose the information to her attorney and did not depend on whether she knew that the disclosure was wrong.” Therefore, it was not improper for the IRS “to consider such intentionality as aggravating.”

Now the fun part – the discussion on the use of the words willful and intentional. The court said that in the petition for review, the employee improperly referred to being charged with “willful disclosure” when her actions were actually charged as intentional. The court said these two words are sometimes used interchangeably but shouldn’t be. And then they told us why:

  • An intentional action is one that an employee commits on purpose, not negligently. It is not a requirement that the employee know the action is illegal, if the agency can show the employee’s intent was to commit the action at issue.
  • A willful action is different; it is an action an employee commits on purpose with knowledge that the act is prohibited. If there is no evidence the employee knew the action was prohibited, the misconduct is not willful, but may be intentional.

The IRS employee acted intentionally when she provided taxpayer information to her attorney. The agency did not charge her with willful disclosure and, therefore, was not required to prove that she specifically knew the act was prohibited by law. The employment law nerd in me just loves this kind of stuff. If you’d like to read the case yourself, it’s Vestal v. Treasury, Fed. Cir. No. 2020-1771 (Jun. 14, 2021). And for more fun discussions on disciplinary charges, join FELTG for the virtual training program Understanding Misconduct: Disciplinary Charges and Penalties, held on July 26 as part of our weeklong program The Post-Pandemic Federal Workplace: Managing Accountability and EEO Challenges. Hopkins@FELTG.com

If You Thought SES Discipline Was Unique, Wait Until You Read About SES Performance Procedures

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By Deborah J. Hopkins, June 16, 2021

Last month, we looked at some of the unique aspects to disciplining a member of the Senior Executive Service (SES). This month, we will cover your agency’s options in the rare event a non-probationary member of the career SES has a performance issue.

Unlike GS and WG employees who can be removed for unacceptable performance entirely unrelated to an annual performance rating, a performance-based removal for an SES member must be based on that employee’s final rating(s) – typically the rating given as part of the annual performance appraisal.

If an SES member is performing unacceptably, however, agencies do not have to wait until the end of the appraisal year. There is flexibility to end an SES member’s appraisal period at any time (after the minimum appraisal period, which is 90 days in most agencies) if there is an adequate basis to prepare a final rating. According to OPM, this rating may “serve as the basis, or part of the basis, for a performance-based action.”

However, the word removal in this context does not mean removal from Federal service (also known as firing); it is removal from the SES, and in cases of unacceptable performance, the SES member has a guaranteed placement right to a non-SES career civil service position. This right to placement does not exist if the SES member is removed for misconduct.

If an SES member is performing unacceptably, the process generally follows these steps:

1 – The agency issues final rating of unsatisfactory or its equivalent (Level 1 in most agencies), at annual rating time or sooner, if the agency has an adequate basis to rate the employee, as detailed above.

2 – The agency notifies the SES member, in writing, of the impending “removal” from the SES, at least 30 days in advance of the removal date. The notice must contain:

  • The reason(s) for the action.
  • The effective date of the action.
  • The employee’s placement rights and information on the position to which the employee will be moved. The placement may be:
    1. A reassignment or transfer to another position within the SES, or
    2. Removal from the SES and placement into a GS-15 or equivalent position, with SES saved pay.

According to OPM, SES saved pay is set at the highest of three alternative rates –

  1. Rate of pay for the position in which the employee is placed;
  2. Rate of pay for the position from which the employee was appointed to the SES; or
  3. Rate of pay earned immediately before removal from the SES
  • Notice of the right to request an informal hearing from the MSPB at least 15 days before the removal is effective (although such an opinion is advisory only and is not binding on the agency). If applicable, the notice must also include the employee’s eligibility for immediate retirement under 5 U.S.C. 8336(h) or 8414(a).

3 – The SES member is placed into the new position on the effective date. Those SES members who held a career or career conditional appointment immediately before entering the SES are entitled to an appointment of equivalent tenure. Those who did not hold such an appointment before SES (for example, they were hired from the private sector) may be appointed using Schedule B authority under 5 CFR 213.3202(m).

There is no traditional MSPB appeal right for a performance-based “removal” from the SES. If the SES member is placed into a GS-15 position and then performs unacceptably, chapter 43 performance procedures would apply.

But wait! We’re not done yet.

Here are a few other odds and ends:

Marginal performance won’t cut it. The SES member receives two final ratings of unsatisfactory within 5 consecutive years, or two final ratings of less than fully successful (a Level 2 rating) within 3 consecutive years, that employee must be removed from the SES and placed in a GS position – they may not be reassigned or transferred to another SES position.

Moratoriums exist. A career SES member may not be reassigned or removed from the SES within 120 days after appointment of a new agency head or of a new noncareer who is the initial rater for the career appointee, unless the reassignment or removal is based upon a final rating of unsatisfactory completed before the moratorium began. This is to protect the SES members from political motivations.

Not demotions, but pay decreases. If an SES member receives a less than fully successful rating or otherwise fails to meet requirements of a critical element and remains in the SES, the agency may reduce the employee’s pay by up to 10 percent, subject to the 12-month restriction on pay adjustments. 5 CFR 534.404(j). Hopkins@FELTG.com

How is Kirkpatrick Act Discipline Different from Traditional Discipline?

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By Deborah Hopkins, June 7, 2021

Last week, the MSPB released a research brief Agency Leader Responsibilities Related to Prohibited Personnel Practices. Since the MSPB still doesn’t have a quorum (1,613 days and over 3,400 Petitions For Review – and counting), publishing research briefs is one function the Board is still able to complete.

This brief looks at specifics in the Dr. Chris Kirkpatrick Whistleblower Protection Act (Kirkpatrick Act), 5 U.S.C. § 7515, which was passed unanimously by the Senate in 2017. The Kirkpatrick Act was named after a VA doctor who reported patient abuse and issues with patient medications (opioids) at the VA Medical Center where he was newly employed. Dr. Kirkpatrick made allegations that he was reprised against for being a whistleblower, and died by suicide shortly after he was removed from his position.

In case you’re not familiar, the Kirkpatrick Act sets out specific requirements for discipline against management officials who reprise against whistleblowers and other employees, specifically limited to the 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b) Prohibited Personnel Practices (PPP) 8, 9, and 14:

  • PPP 8 addresses retaliating or threatening to retaliate against a whistleblower.
  • PPP 9 addresses retaliating or threatening to retaliate against a person who exercises his/her/their right to participate in an appeal, complaint, or grievance (including as a witness), and retaliating or threatening to retaliate against an employee who refuses to obey an order that would require an individual to violate a law, rule, or regulation.
  • PPP 14 involves accessing the medical record of an employee or applicant as part of the commission of any other PPP.

If there is a finding of what MSPB in its brief refers to as a “Kirkpatrick PPP,” then specific requirements must be met in proposing discipline. We’ll discuss those below.

But first, according to the report, while “[t]he Kirkpatrick Act does not state what constitutes a determination that a Kirkpatrick PPP was committed or how to determine who committed the PPP in question,” the finding of a Kirkpatrick PPP can only be made by:

  • The head of the agency employing the supervisor;
  • An administrative law judge;
  • The MSPB;
  • The U.S. Office of Special Counsel (OSC);
  • A judge of the United States;
  • The Inspector General (IG) of the agency.

This seems to exclude the findings of a standard misconduct investigation unless, of course, the agency head reads the ROI and decides reprisal has occurred. Once the reprisal finding is made, the Kirkpatrick Act details the following process:

The head of the agency shall:

  1. Propose a suspension of at least three days (for a first offense), or propose removal (for a second offense by the same supervisor).
  2. Provide the employee 14 days to respond to the proposal, and allow the employee to be represented and to review the material relied upon; and
  3. Exercise judgment when considering the employee’s response and deciding to implement the proposed action, with the decision due by the end of the 15th business day (5 CFR § 752.103; this timeline may be amended in the future as a result of Executive Order 14003.)

There’s another interesting caveat to the Kirkpatrick Act. It only applies to actions taken against supervisors, as defined by 5 U.S.C. § 7103(a). If you have a few minutes to look it over, the brief can be found here. It includes a nice side-by-side chart comparing Traditional Discipline with Kirkpatrick Discipline. The brief also details various training on PPPs that agencies must require (including supervisor training on Kirkpatrick discipline), so please let us know if you’d like us to help you out there. After all, it’s what we do. Hopkins@FELTG.com.

Three Takeaways from the 2020 FEVS

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By Deborah Hopkins, May 24, 2021

The 2020 FEVS was released a few days ago. Thanks to COVID-19, it looks somewhat different than past FEVS. But, as always, it is full of interesting and helpful information about how employees view their agencies, their supervisors, their coworkers, and more. Below are three key takeaways.

1. Agencies still have a long way to go on performance accountability.

In the 2020 FEVS, one of the worst scores out of all the topics covered came as a result of this item: In my work unit, steps are taken to deal with a poor performer who cannot or will not improve. (Q. 10). Only 42 percent of employees agreed with this statement, which means 58 percent of employees think that supervisors don’t do enough to hold unacceptable performers accountable. Not great.

While this number is trending better than it has in recent years (it was 36 percent in 2019 and 28 percent in 2018), we can all agree that 42 percent is not the target any agency aims for. That’s a failing grade no matter how you look at it.

FELTG has been working with a few agencies on a targeted approach to increase performance accountability through a structured set of training on topics, including writing effective performance standards, providing feedback that makes a difference, and holding employees accountable. These agencies have seen their individual FEVS scores on this item increase significantly, which tells us that the good employees really appreciate when supervisors focus time and effort on employee performance matters.

2. The grade on diversity hiring and representation is a solid C+.

In response to this item: My supervisor is committed to a workforce representative of all segments of society (Q. 20), 79% of employees agreed.

With President Biden’s numerous Executive Orders highlighting the government’s role in promoting diversity, especially among traditionally underserved populations, we can anticipate that agencies will work on bringing this number up in 2021. In many agencies, leadership is especially focused on nondiscriminatory hiring, reasonable accommodation for employees with disabilities, raising awareness about LGBTQ issues, and training on types of microaggressions and bias that often lead to hostile work environment allegations.

3. COVID-19 definitely impacted agency performance, but not as much as you might think.

One of the new sections in the FEVS dealt with the impacts of COVID-19 on agencies’ ability to meet customer needs and focus on mission results while the world was turned upside down from the pandemic. The graphic below shows that while there have been some struggles, Federal employees have found ways to contribute to agency mission and customer service despite unprecedented working conditions, whether that was transitioning to work 100% from home, spending 12 hour shifts in PPE, working around the clock to develop tests, treatments, or vaccines, and much more.

If you haven’t yet read the FEVS, you can find it on OPM’s website here. It’s worth a look, and when you’re ready to talk to FELTG about how we can help you improve your agency’s scores (because after all, higher scores mean your employees are happier, and if your employees are happier they are more productive), we’ll be here. Hopkins@FELTG.com

 

What You Should Know About SES Discipline

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By Deborah Hopkins, May 21, 2021

While it’s rare to see an individual in the Senior Executive Service (SES) receive disciplinary action, every now and then an SES breaks bad, and agencies respond accordingly. During a recent UnCivil Servant training class [Editor’s note: Don’t miss our next UnCivil Servant class February 12-13, 2025], we received a number of questions about the process of disciplining a career SES, so I thought I’d share an overview with the FELTG Nation. As you’ll see there are some similarities between SES and non SES discipline – and a few significant differences. OPM has a helpful fact sheet on the topic.

An agency may take disciplinary action against a career SES member (covered by subchapter V of chapter 75 of title 5 of the U.S. Code) only for misconduct, neglect of duty, malfeasance, or failure to accept a directed reassignment or to accompany a position in a transfer of function.

Unlike unacceptable performance cases, which rather than removal provide the SES with placement rights into another position, any career SES removed for disciplinary reasons has no placement rights.

How it’s the same 

Probationers. A probationary career SES member who was not covered by 5 U.S.C. 7511 immediately before SES appointment may be removed (in this context removal means fired) for misconduct. The employee must be notified in writing, and the action must be effective before the end of the last scheduled workday in the probationary period. For removals over conditions arising before appointment to the SES, the agency must provide advance written notice (the proposal letter) stating specific reasons for proposed removal, an opportunity to reply, and a written decision showing reasons for the action and the effective date.

Procedures for non-probationers. For suspensions greater than 14 days and for removals, the SES is entitled to advance written notice, at least 7 days to respond, the right to a representative, an impartial decision, and the right to appeal the action to MSPB.

How it’s different

Nexus. The “efficiency of the service” standard used for non-SES employees does not apply in SES discipline. However, if an agency wishes to take disciplinary action based on the appointee’s off-duty actions or misconduct, the agency must demonstrate a direct connection between the off-duty actions and the appointee’s ability to carry out the assigned responsibilities of his/her/their position.

No short suspensions. The law is silent on short suspensions for SES. OPM’s interpretation is that because there is no statutory authority for such action, agencies may not suspend an SES member for 14 days or fewer. However, agencies are not restricted from issuing a written reprimand for an offense that does not warrant a suspension or removal.

No demotions. By law, there are no demotions in the SES. That said, an agency is allowed to reduce the pay of a career SES appointee by up to 10 percent as disciplinary action for misconduct.

If the agency chooses this route, the SES must be:

  • Provided written notice at least 15 days in advance of the effective date,
  • Given at least 7 days to respond,
  • Given the opportunity to have a representative,
  • Given a written decision containing reasons for any pay reduction, and
  • Given an opportunity to request reconsideration by the agency head within 7 days of the decision.

There is no third party review of this type of pay reduction. Sometimes, in lieu of a pay reduction, an agency will remove the SES member for misconduct, and then appoint them into a GS-15 or 14 position.

I hope this helps clarify the specifics on disciplining an SES. Next time, we’ll tackle SES performance. Hopkins@FELTG.com

Answering Questions on the New PIP Requirement, Post-Santos

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By Deborah Hopkins, April 27, 2021

A couple weeks ago, Bob Woods and I held a webinar on the new PIP justification requirement issued by the Federal Circuit in Santos v. NASA, No. 2019-2345, (Fed. Cir. Mar. 11, 2021), that undid more than 40 years of case precedent. In case you missed the news flash, the law now requires agencies to have substantial evidence of poor performance before they can place an employee on a PIP – and they must present that evidence as part of their case in chief before the MSPB, should there be a performance-based removal. If you haven’t yet read the article, I wrote about it last month. You’ll want to take a look at that first before you keep reading: Say Goodbye to 40 Years of Case Precedent: Agencies Must Justify PIPs.

And if you didn’t attend the webinar, we’re holding a live encore webinar May 11, where we get into all the necessary details, requirements, and takeaways. Because this is the most significant case on performance since the very early days of the Civil Service Reform Act, it’s one you can’t afford to miss.

In the meantime, I thought I’d give you a preview of the kinds of questions that Bob and I received during the webinar. Please keep in mind that the information presented here is for informational purposes only and not for the purpose of providing legal advice. Contacting FELTG in any way/format does not create the existence of an attorney-client relationship.

Q: How long does an agency need to show the employee was performing at an unacceptable level, prior to implementing a PIP?

A: The Santos case doesn’t give any indication about a minimum time period, it requires the agency show substantial evidence of unacceptable performance. Sometimes one mistake on one day could equal unacceptable performance; other times it might take a month or two for an employee to reach a certain number of exceptions to a standard, that causes their performance to become unacceptable.

Agencies shouldn’t feel obligated to come up with an arbitrary number of days to satisfy the requirement (we’ve heard some agencies advising anywhere from 30 to 90 days or more – eek!), but instead should look at the performance standards to be sure the unacceptable performance the supervisor has seen, actually matches the written standard for unacceptable. As soon as that happens, the PIP can be justified.

Q: Can the notification of unacceptable performance be part of the PIP? Our standard PIP normally includes language like “This is to information you that your performance is unacceptable” and gives examples. Is this adequate?

A: Yes, it sounds adequate. While FELTG recommends including the justification document as an attachment, this approach you’ve detailed should also satisfy the Federal Circuit’s requirement post-Santos to document pre-PIP unacceptable performance.

Q: For the “roller coaster” employee who, for example, “passes” the initial 30-day PIP, and receives notification that they passed, if they then later dip in performance and their performance warrants removal, is it necessary for the agency to provide another notice that the performance has dipped before removal? Without an intervening notice, the only notice the employee would receive before the removal is that they passed the PIP.

A: There’s no requirement in the law to provide notice, but we recommend at the conclusion of the PIP, to issue a “Performance Warning Letter” that lets the employee know they will be removed at any time between now and X date (the end of the one-year period, with Day 1 of the PIP starting the year) if their performance becomes unacceptable on the critical element(s) from the PIP.

If the employee falls back into unacceptable performance after successfully completing the PIP within the one-year period, the only notice they receive at that point is the notice of proposed removal, which will articulate their unacceptable performance that the proposed removal is based on.

Q: What are your thoughts regarding employees who, at times, perform “other duties as assigned” and are then placed on a PIP based on unacceptable performance on those ODAA? Is it still OK to place an employee on a PIP based on the observed unacceptable performance or is it better to stick to the critical elements outlined in the performance plan?

A: A PIP may only be used for unacceptable performance related to the critical elements in the employee’s performance plan. If the ODAA relates to a critical element, the agency is free to PIP. But if it’s something unrelated to any critical element, for example a special assignment because the employee is on covid-related telework, it would be inappropriate to place an employee on a PIP. Such a situation could be handled with the Chapter 75 procedures. We have a webinar on this topic May 13, Handling Teleworker Performance and Conduct Challenges, if you need more details.

Good luck with this new requirement. Let us know how it’s going out there. Hopkins@FELTG.com

The information presented here is for informational purposes only and not for the purpose of providing legal advice. Contacting FELTG in any way/format does not create the existence of an attorney-client relationship. If you need legal advice, you should contact an attorney.

The Golden Doodle Who Wouldn’t Nuzzle: A Service Dog, or Not?

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By Deborah Hopkins, April 20, 2021

While preparing the materials for an upcoming training session Ricky Rowe and I are presenting at FELTG’s annual Emerging Issues in Federal Employment Law virtual forum, I came across a case that I thought prudent to share – especially because, as return to work orders are issued in the coming months, agencies are likely to see an uptick in requests for service animals and emotional support animals in the workplace.

In a recent case at the Department of Veterans Affairs, the complainant suffered from PTSD, depression, anxiety, and panic attacks. Because of her medical conditions, she requested an accommodation to bring her trained service dog, a golden doodle, to work. She informed the agency that her dog was scent-trained to recognize chemical shifts in her body when she was escalating into anxiety or panic attacks. The dog was trained to alert and calm her before she reached the panic stage. The complainant explained to agency management that her dog might bark in the process of alerting her to her escalating symptoms, as that was the dog’s alert mechanism.

The agency approved accommodation for a 30-day trial. During a meeting shortly thereafter, the dog repeatedly barked and was disruptive for more than 30 minutes. Because of the disruption,  management began considering removing the interim accommodation, but did not take action.

The dog became even more disruptive in a subsequent meeting. According to agency management, the dog appeared impossible to handle. During the meeting, it continually barked, and jumped on the complainant multiple times, and she was unable to calm it down.

The complainant explained the dog’s behavior was an alert to her oncoming anxiety attacks. She said that the dog was trained to stand in front of her, put her paws on her shoulders and nuzzle her to calm her down. Agency management’s account of the events was that the dog was not nuzzling the complainant, but jumping on her and others in the workplace, and was uncontrollable.

As a result, the agency terminated the interim accommodation, stating that the dog was too disruptive and impossible to handle in the office. The agency invited the complainant to discuss alternative accommodations, including liberal use of leave when she was experiencing symptoms, but she maintained that other than having her service dog, there was no other useful accommodation.

The agency denied her request to keep the dog in the workplace, so she filed a complaint and the FAD found for the agency. On appeal, EEOC looked at the facts and said the agency was not obligated to allow the service dog in the workplace because the complainant “failed to provide evidence to adequately establish the need for the presence of her dog in order to assist her in performing [her] essential functions.”  EEOC also said they “cannot reasonably conclude that the Agency’s decision to terminate its trial approval constitutes an unlawful failure to accommodate.” Kathie N. v. VA, EEOC No. 2019003312 (Sep. 22, 2020).

So remember, if an employee wants to bring a service animal into the workplace, having a disability is not enough. The employee must establish the need for the specific use or presence of the service animal as accommodation, and that no other accommodation would be effective. For more on this, join us for the session Barking Up the Wrong Tree? Service and Therapy Animals in the Workspace, part of Emerging Issues in Federal Employment Law, April 28. Hopkins@FELTG.com

Say Goodbye to 40 Years of Case Precedent: Agencies Must Justify PIPs

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By Deborah Hopkins, March 16, 2021

For the past 20+ years, we have taught a principle in performance cases that has been around since the beginning of the Civil Service Reform Act: An agency does not need to justify putting an employee on a performance demonstration period, what we at FELTG now refer to as a DP, formerly known as a PIP. In teaching that well-established principle, we relied on the statute (5 U.S.C. 4302-4303), relevant OPM regulations, and a number of foundational MSPB cases, such as  Wilson v. Navy, 24 M.S.P.R. 583 (1984); Wright v. Labor, 82 M.S.P.R. 186 (1999); and Clifford v. USDA, 50 M.S.P.R. 232 (1991).

Imagine our surprise last week when the Federal Circuit issued a decision that said an agency must have substantial evidence that the employee was performing poorly BEFORE it is allowed to put an employee on a PIP. Santos v. NASA, No. 2019-2345 (Fed. Cir. Mar. 11, 2021).

Not long after beginning work for a new supervisor, the appellant (Santos) was placed on a 45-day PIP, and given 11 deliverable assignments. His supervisor met with him to discuss his progress and give him feedback on his work product. The supervisor ultimately determined that Santos’s performance on the deliverables was unsatisfactory, so she proposed removal for unacceptable performance, and the deciding official concurred in the penalty.

Santos appealed and claimed, among other things, that he was mistreated because of his military service, and that work he did not perform while he was on military leave was unfairly used to assess his performance. Part of his appeal included a claim that he should never have been put on a PIP in the first place, something the Board AJ did not address because the matter was well-settled in  MSPB case law: “[A]n agency is not required to prove that an appellant was performing unacceptably prior to the PIP.” Wright v. Labor, 82 M.S.P.R. 186 (1999). On review of the Board’s case, the Federal Circuit said:

The Board has held that … an agency [is not required] to prove that an employee was performing unacceptably prior to the PIP in order to justify a post-PIP removal. See Wilson [supra] … (finding “no statutory or regulatory basis” to require an agency to establish appellant’s unsatisfactory performance prior to the PIP1). The Board has consistently applied this interpretation to PIP removals.

Yes, this is as old as time, in our business. But here’s where things change:

We have not directly addressed the question of whether, when an agency predicates removal on an employee’s failure to satisfy obligations imposed by a PIP and that removal is challenged, the agency must justify imposition of a PIP in the first instance under 5 U.S.C. § 4302, though we have discussed the general relevance of pre-PIP performance to a PIP removal. See Harris v. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, 972 F.3d 1307, 1316–17 (Fed. Cir. 2020). Today we confirm that the statute’s plain language demonstrates that an agency must justify institution of a PIP when an employee challenges a PIP-based removal. [bold added]

The Federal Circuit arrives at this by focusing on the 5 U.S.C. § 4302(c)(6) requirement that agencies remove, reassign or demote employees who continue to have unacceptable performance but only after an opportunity to demonstrate acceptable performance. That opportunity period is the DP/PIP. That’s not new. But then:

To “continue to have unacceptable performance” during the PIP, as the statutory text requires, an employee must have displayed unacceptable performance prior to the PIP. Under the plain meaning of the statute, then, an agency must defend a challenged removal by establishing that the employee had unacceptable performance before the PIP and “continue[d] to” do so during the PIP. [bold added]

Santos also relies on discussion in the notice of proposed rulemaking for OPM’s recently amended regulation at 5 C.F.R. § 432.104, which says agencies are not relieved “of the responsibility to demonstrate that an employee was performing unacceptably – which per statute covers the period both prior to and during a formal opportunity period – before initiating an adverse action under chapter 43.” More from the court:

Confirming an agency’s obligation to justify initiation of a PIP where the PIP leads to removal is particularly appropriate, moreover, in situations resembling Santos’s, where an employee alleges that both the PIP and the removal based on the PIP were in retaliation for protected conduct. Otherwise, an agency could establish a PIP in direct retaliation for protected conduct and set up unreasonable expectations in the PIP in the hopes of predicating removal on them without ever being held accountable for the original retaliatory conduct. Indeed, these are the circumstances in which the issue of pre-PIP performance would be most relevant.

We used to teach that as long as an agency could articulate the reason for poor performance, they could put an employee on a PIP, and the employee could not challenge the placement on a PIP. So, where does that leave us, post-Santos?

What’s New:

  • Agencies must have substantial evidence of poor performance in order to justify putting an employee on a PIP.
  • The decision about how to justify the PIP is up to the agency, so documentation of the reason(s) the supervisor begins the PIP should suffice. That’s something we at FELTG have always taught supervisors to do, in case they ended up defending against a reprisal complaint at some point in the future. But a big question lingers: is that enough?
  • The Federal Circuit does not prescribe any particular evidentiary showing with respect to the employee’s pre-PIP performance, but the emphasis is on continued poor performance. So how long is long enough, before implementing a PIP?
  • The burden is on the employee to prove that the motive for imposing the PIP was discriminatory.

What’s Still the Same:

  • “[A]n employee may not seek review of the decision to implement a PIP at the time it is instituted, either at the Board or otherwise.”
  • The institution of the PIP satisfies the notice component of 5 U.S.C. 4303.

Go ahead and absorb that. It changes 40-plus years of precedent. It’s completely doable, and we’ll explain exactly how to do so during MSPB Law Week later this month, or on May 11 at 11 am ET when we present Justifying Your PIP? What the Precedent-Breaking Fed Circuit Decision Means.

And before I go, let me just say this: some of the facts in this case don’t look good for the agency – the actual administration of the PIP was fine, but the proximity of certain management actions to Santos’s military service should be scrutinized. The Federal Circuit remanded the case back for a Board determination about whether Santos was the victim of reprisal under USERRA, so we don’t have an answer on that yet. But regardless of the outcome, we appreciate his service. Hopkins@FELTG.com